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Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry:
Interpretation and Discovery in Law from the
Perspective of Peirce's Speculative Rhetoric
ROBERTA KEVFLSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION AND MAIN THRUST

Because I have written extensively elsewhere on Peirce's speculative
rhetoric'-a term synonymous with semiotic methodology in his philosophy
of signs-little attempt will be made here to discuss in detail this concept
except to clarify it with respect to interpretation and discovery procedures
in law. In brief, Peirce's semiotic methodology, or speculative rhetoric, is
the highest division of his expanded, pragmatic logic. It seeks to account
for the development of meaning in verbal signs in all acts of inquiry, such
that a sign is shown to interpret its previous sign, or referent in discourse,
and to bring a cumulation of meaning forward in a dynamic and openended process. The result of any given inquiry is a judgment which corresponds to the. conclusion of'a logical argument.
From the perspective of pragmatics, as defined by Peirce, a judgment is
a value-sign which acts to bring about an end or goal which, ultimately,
has effectual bearing on practical affairs in society. According to Peirce's
scheme, ethics, or conduct in practical affairs, is governed by value-signs
and value-systems which are networks of interrelating signs. All of logic, or
possible modes of reasoning, in turn, is dependent on ethical systems. Thus,
while speculative rhetoric, or methodology, as the highest level of reasoning
underlies the process of developing values and value-systems, the whole of
possible choices of modes of reasoning is subordinate to value-judgments
which are, themselves, the consequents of previous processes of inquiry.
A system of value-judgments in general may be said to correspond with
a code of law in that it functions as a point of reference. However, in
Peirce's view no code is ever complete, and thus all judgments may be
regarded as provisional only, capable of reinterpretation and reformation.
Peirce's insistence on the incompleteness of codes, or law-like judgments, is

* Associate Professor, Penn State University-Berks, Reading, Pennsylvania.
1. Additional discussion of Peirce's speculative rhetoric can be found in R. KEVELSON,
CHARLES S. PEIRCE's METHOD OF METHODS (1986); Kevelson, Time as Method in Charles S.
Peirce, 2 Am. J. SEMIoncs 267 (1983); Kevelson, Peirce'sDialogism and Continuous Predicate,
18 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC'Y 110 (1982).
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directly opposed to the Benthamite 2 conviction which holds that a code in
law must be in all respects complete in all its parts. In short, Bentham
presupposes a closed system of inquiry whereas Peirce's concepts of indeterminacy, infinity or openendedness, and interpretation in inquiry stress the
dynamic development of all systems of thought. In this case, the legal system
and its encoding/decoding process is of concern. From the Peircean perspective, a logic of justification in the traditional sense is inadequate to the
task of describing a continually changing and evolving process. Rather, it
is a logic of discovery and inquiry which is not only more appropriate, but
because more appropriate is more ethically suited for the task of accounting
for the actual procedures in practical life. These actual procedures, prototypically, we find in the legal procedures of discovery and interpretation in
open, or relatively open, social systems such as the United States.
As has been written elsewhere, 3 there is strong evidence for assuming that
not only was Peirce critically influenced by issues and problems in the law
during the last half of the nineteenth century, but was influential upon a
radically new approach to discovery and interpretation in the practice of
law. Indeed, as this article claims, it may be said that Peirce stands behind
that whole movement in American law known generally as legal realism.
Legal realism is not a term which stands for a homogeneous approach to
the law, and neither does it represent a unified and systematically cohesive
theory of jurisprudence. Rather, the term legal realism may be regarded as
indicating certain characteristics in the transformation of American law in
the period roughly between the 1870's and the 1930's. This demarcation of
the sixty years, -more or less, of this period in which some of the most
important spokesmen of legal realism practiced and preached, should not
lead one to assume that this movement sprang into being like Minerva, whole
from Jupiter's ear, nor abruptly ended at a time coincident with the great
economic depression in this country. On the contrary, the first major expression of a semiotic approach to legal discovery and interpretation is to be
found in Francis Lieber's 1839 Legal and Political Hermeneutics.' Lieber's
work was a major reaction against Savigny's theory of legal interpretation,
and also, in significant ways, anticipated Peirce's philosophy of signs and
sign interpretation, or semiotics, and forecast more directly, with respect to
law, Oliver Wendell Holmes' effectual transformation of American consti-

2. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

334 (1948) (1st ed. 1780).

3. See Kevelson, Legal Speech Acts: Decisions, in LINGUISTICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 121
(R. DiPietro ed. 1982); Kevelson, Semiotics and Law in ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF SEMIOTICS
(T. Sebeok ed. 1986); see also Kevelson, Semiotics and the Art of Conversation, 32 SEMIOTICA
53 (1980).
4. See F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (3d ed. 1880).
5. See F. SAVIGNY, I SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 166-268 (ed. 1979) (1st ed.
Berlin 1849).
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tutional law and his impact on the development of legal realism both in this
country and abroad.
This article focuses on Peirce's contribution to legal realism, through which
processes of discovery and interpretation in American law were raised as
problems and issues in the law. Peirce's contributions have subsequently
become modified, sometimes radically transformed, and have consequently
come to be seen in current practice as significant areas in the law in need
of critical investigation.
It should be pointed out in passing, without close discussion at this time,
that a semiotics perspective on law which this article assumes and carries
forward is not to be confused with some recent structuralist approaches to
law. These structuralist approaches are sometimes confused with what is
intended here and in previous writings 6-legal semiotics. Although, from a
historical point of view the emergence of structuralism and semiotics in this
country coincided around the early 1960's, totally different philosophical
assumptions underlie each of these approaches, despite certain similarities
which appear on the surface. Also, while there are important correlations
between a semiotic approach to legal interpretation and the popular continental movement in hermeneutics 7 the relationship between a Peirce-grounded
semiotics and its method of interpretation and inquiry is not so much
superficial as it is reflective of a divergence between the objectives of these
two modes of sign interpretation. It is the task of the investigator of Peircean
semiotics to recognize and distinguish Peirce's influence in semiotic studies
of law and other areas which are not so explicitly labelled. It is the investigator's further task, then, to argue that although Peirce's enormous contributions are rarely directly discussed, they do actually constitute the basis
of realism in law and its related movements. 8 While James and Dewey are
most often cited as the philosophical forebears of these movements in American law, 9 and Peirce's work is largely neglected in this literature, this
oversight may be attributed to the fact that the greatest bulk of Peirce's
writings was not available to the early writers on realism, and, indeed, has
only become accessible in very recent years. Thus, a legal semiotics as
proposed here and elsewhere intends, not only to correct this oversight, but
more importantly, to attempt to show how Peirce's thought, in total, may
provide new directions and even some solutions to current problems in
interpretation and discovery and in those closely related institutions of economics and politics.

6. See especially R. KEVELSON, supra note 1.
7. For a discussion of the Hermeneutics movement on the Continent, see R. BERNSTEIN,
(1983).
8. For a discussion of the relation between the terms "Legal Pragmatism" and "Legal
Instrumentalism," see R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
9. See id. at 19-80.
BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVIsM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS
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More than forty years ago Max Fisch showed clearly the relation between
Peirce's pragmatism and the prediction theory in law which is generally
associated with Justice Holmes. 0 Indeed, less than a year earlier we also
find Edwin Garlan actively descrying the then, and still current, practice of
our official legal actors "still struggling against a frame of reference predicated upon premises, principles, and method characteristic of eighteenthcentury rationalism and nineteenth-century evolutionism and utilitarianism,
attitudes which have already been seriously questioned and modified in other
social disciplines."" Garlan correctly understands that the law must also
' 2
move in a new direction toward a "pragmatic philosophy of law." '
Legal realism is such a movement and its purpose, according to Garlan,
is dual: it intends law as an "experimental and fact-controlled method,"
and also-inseparably also-as a process of "functional interpretation" of
its assumptions, rules, and statutes, in which law is always to be regarded
as coordinate with other social institutions and, therefore, capable of being
"tested by its contributions to the larger whole."' 3 We recall here Holmes'
assertion that the Constitution of the United States is nothing but an experiment.'4 An experiment, in semiotic terms, is an operation or series of
operations upon an hypothesis, or possible idea. An idea, which is, to Peirce,
simply another word for a possibility, is a sign. An idea, then, is a representation of some realizeable aim or goal. It is a complex structure which
is not fixed and permanent, but which is malleable and cultivatable. An
idea, regarded as an area of thought, may be so defined and circumscribed
by boundaries which, for the purposes of experimentation and investigation,
distinguish it from its customary ground or context. It is growable and thus
capable of quantitative as well as qualitative change, increasing in its extensive
and its intensive dimensions. Inquiry as a process is such a method for
increasing the yield of an area of thought, or idea, or sign-and in our
case-of law itself as an experiment.
If the main purpose of correct reasoning in general is to reduce uncertainty
in selected instances, the main purpose of law in particular is to reduce
uncertainty with respect to social interactions which fall within the province
of institutional jurisdiction. Within the institution of law itself the legal
practitioner or lawyer is primarily concerned with prediction, not only as it
bears on the theoretical problems of judicial interpretations and opinions,
but also because prediction, as a theory of law, permits some limited certainty

10. See Fisch, Justice Holmes,the Predication Theory of Law,and Pragmatism, 39 J. PHIL.
85 (1942).
11. See E. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 3 (1941).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 6.
14. See O.W. HOLMES, A Theory of Legal Interpretation, inCOLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203
(1952); see also Dewey, Justice Holmes and the Liberal Mind, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 33 (F.
Frankfurter ed. 1931).
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with respect to the future action of the courts.' 5 Thus, legal realism attempts
a thorough-going pragmatic transformation of the idea of law such that no
contradiction should separate legal theory from legal praxis. But the lawyer,
no less than the legal philosopher, should be engaged in the same acts of
law-where "act" is both on the level of ideas, and their development in
thought, and in the courts with respect to practical legal procedure.
What is needed, Peirce stressed, is not a doctrine, but a method such that
the consequences of discovery and inquiry in thought may be'understood as
representations of actual phenomenal processes in the world of experience.
Thus, Peirce's semiotics was intended to represent, as a whole, actual processes of inquiry in experience. The prototypical experience has long been
regarded as the relation between persons in society and the law, just as the
legal argument is assumed to be the prototype of ordinary argument.' 6 As
has been claimed elsewhere,' 7 and is briefly repeated here, Peirce's expanded
logic, or semiotics, is a representation of this legal relation. His method of
methods may be understood as a model for interpreting models of inquiry
of which signs and systems of signs constitute the material for the understanding.
As Garlan writes: "What realism has attacked is .. not logic but the
tendency to use logic along with insufficient concern for any but the formal
character of the premises. Its own aim is an adequate, though thus far
unobtainable, logical structure."' 8
Not only is Garlan representative of his colleagues in his failure to recognize that in Peirce's expanded logic, or semiotics, the legal realists had
that which they claimed was needed, but in addition, Garlan is representative
of a more current failure. For today, it remains for present investigators to
bring to the attention of the legal community Peirce's thought as it directly
bears on some of the most problematic issues in law which include the
economic basis of legal interpretation as well as the interpretation in the
courts of economic issues.
In the following, some of the major problems in discovery and interpretation in law will be indicated, although time does not permit detailed
discussion. The general background of these problems will be pointed to,
and the attempts of legal realism to deal with them, on specific issues, will
be recalled.
It is of special importance to show that some of the major conflicts between
legal realists themselves, and between legal realists and their opponents,
derive from an inadequate grasp of the pragmatic assumptions which underlie
realism and give it its impetus as a movement in American law. For example,

15. E. GARLAN, supra note 11, at 6.
16. S. TOULaM, THE UsEs OF ARGUMENT (1958).
17. See R. KEVELSON, supra note 1; see especially id. at ch. 7.
18. E. GARLAN, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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neither James' nor Dewey's versions of pragmatism carry forward certain
of Peirce's ideas which still need to be examined in this context. Also,
because Peirce did not conceive of a direct application of his pragmatics,
or "pragmaticism" as he later termed it, to practical affairs, there has been
a general tendency to disregard his actual and significant contributions to
law, and to legal-economic theory and practice.' 9 There have been, fortunately, outstanding exceptions to the general disregard of Peircean thought
in the practical science of law, politics and economics. For example, Hayek's
views on the economic bases of law in a free society oppose Keynsian thought
in a manner which recalls Peirce's own rejection and refutation of Keynsian
economics and Benthamite utilitarianism. Here, again, time permits only
brief discussion of these issues, which must be taken up elsewhere for more
comprehensive examination.
Briefly, also, the widespread assumption of the deontic structure of law
will be discussed and shown to be inadequate. Rather, inquiry based on a
Peircean semiotics corresponds much more closely to an erotetic structure,
or a logic of questions and answers. While both deontic and erotetic structures presuppose a dialogic relationship, it is only the erotetic model which
correctly indicates that a law is potentially problematic, and of the nature
of a question rather than as a command, or an absolute given. The assumed
givenness is, as Peirce stresses, hypothetical only, and thus open to a method
of interpretation which is, in effect, a method of creating new law. Frank's
famous question on this point will be discussed in this context.
The concluding section of this paper raises the question of whether proposed reforms in civil discovery law, especially in the United States, will
bring about reductions in obstructions to justice in the courts by significantly
minimizing the predominant adversarial system of adjudication which prevails today. The adversarial system as currently practiced is harshly criticized
from many quarters as an unwanted vestige of the "sporting theory of
justice." These criticisms, as will be pointed out, spring from those who
also advocate stronger federal codification of rules and regulations governing
commerce. It may be suggested that the strongest objections to more inclusive
and comprehensive discovery charge discovery with promoting "overdiscovery." Levine's study found, 20 for example, that the "use of discovery is so
excessive as to cause unnecessary expense and delay and to permit the betterfinanced litigant to coerce his opponent into an unfair settlement." '2 What
is lacking in the current controversy is a well-defined model-a logic of
discovery that is appropriate, not to a closed system of thought or of society,
but rather, to such open, pluralistic societies as characterize modern de-

19. Cf. R.
20. See J.

SUMMERS, supra note
LEVINE, DISCOVERY:

8.
A

COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND
DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 115 (1982).

21. Id.

AMERICAN CIVIL
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mocracies. This logic of discovery should also be appropriate to such multidimensional, open and motion-picture systems of thought as Peirce attempted
to account for in those aspects of his existential graphs 22 which were primarily
concerned with the modalities of possibilities.
It is worth noting, in passing, that our present interest in the impact of
American pragmatism on one of the most revolutionary movements in the
history of law, which in a general sense has been termed legal realism, was
one of the major commitments of the Institute of Law which was established
at The Johns Hopkins University in the late 1920's. This important research
came to a virtual standstill, not through lack of interest nor because of any
failure to develop significant relations between pragmatic philosophy and
legal problems, but rather because of lack of funding brought about by the
Great Depression. The Hopkins Institute was seen as a victim of economics
in its demise; but its mission reemerged in the 1960's with modern semiotics.
Scholars, who identify modern semiotics with Peirce's thought in general,
and who regard legal semiotics as both root and ramifications of Peirce's
semiotic philosophy-the method of which is pragmatics in the comprehensive sense intended by Peirce-now reassume it, as is argued here and.
elsewhere, 23 as their mission.
Rumble's opinion that legal realism is founded on pragmatism is widely
shared. 24 The literature on this aspect of the relationship between American
philosophy and American law is enormous, and need only be mentioned
here in passing. Rumble correctly points out that for more than three-quarters
of a century the link between pragmatism and the new law has been acknowledged; but what has been lacking since Holmes, especially in his
correspondence with Harold Laski, 26 is a thorough-going inquiry into the
influence of pragmatism on law. While it was unmistakeably clear to the
Legal Realists that the "indispensable first step ...

is to trace the impact

upon them of the pragmatism of James and Dewey, the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, and the views of Mr. Justice Holmes," 27 we
find little or no mention of Peirce. Thus, not only has this first step not
been completed, but it cannot even be properly initiated until Peirce's semiotics is firmly put in place as the ground from which, and against which,
this movement was brought forward. Pragmatism, Rumble notes, "was the
dominant current of philosophical thought in the 1920's and 1930's. The
22. Peirce's Existential Graphs were designed as a means of presenting a visual structure
of the logical development of a cohesive argument or idea. Peirce completed the Graphs to
represent deductive and inductive modes of reasoning, but never completed the graphs which
explain and show modal reasoning.
23. See R. KEVEsoN, supra note 1.
24. See W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 1-20 & passim (1968).
25. Id.
26. See HOLMEs-LASKI LETTERS (M. Howe ed. 1953).
27. Id.
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realists were not, in general, philosophers who applied ready-made systems
to the law. They were lawyers first and foremost, ' 28 who concurred with
Dewey's assertion that the "logic of rigid demonstration" is inadequate and
that what is needed is a "logic of search and discovery ... an experimental
logic ... a logic of inquiry." 29 In these remarks, prefatory to his major
work on the logic of inquiry in which he recovers much but not all of
Peirce's semiotic method of inquiry, Dewey unmistakeably shows the constructivist aspect of all systems of thought as models of action in the world.
Thought itself is viewed, as in Peirce, as significant actions which are oriented
to goals and consequences and are not merely reflective of, or extensions
of, antecendents and referents.
Such a view presents serious problems, not only for semiotics or logicand Peirce regarded semiotics as the whole of logic-but on a workaday
level, for law. If the referential function of a legal code is no longer to be
regarded as a complete and fixed authority, and yet, if the rules for openended inquiry and discovery in law are to be specified with respect to any
given system of law, how is discovery to proceed when the guidelines or
Tules determining discovery are only provisional and modifiable in response
to the outcome of discovery procedures? Are discovery and interpretation
not only to be antithetical to the "sporting theory of justice," but are they
to go beyond the old adversarial, "sporting" system by infusing the processes
at every stage with an element which resembles, at the surface, capriciousness? How is chance to be inseparable from the logic of inquiry proposed
by the pragmatists, and yet not force judicial interpretation and discovery
into a kind of institutional instability? Further, if the rules for interpretation
and discovery are said to be a part of any given system of law which they
govern, then it must be conceded that the system of law, as a whole, is
unstable and that this instability is desirable. What should be apparent here
is that legal reasoning, from the realists' point of view, if it is faithful to
its pragmaticground, must violate the traditionallaws of contradiction, that
is, a legal system in the process of Becoming rather than one which is at
least, ideally, existent and in place. Indeed, this is precisely what Peirce
shows us: the traditional laws of thought are inadequate to describe the
actual process of evolving ideas, and logics need to be constructed which
sustain paradox and account for contradiction and which do not attempt to
impose reductive solutions. It is in this area of inquiry, which involves
indeterminate situations, that Dewey fails to bring forward Peirce's more
radical concepts; yet, it is Dewey, rather than Peirce, who became the
philosophic touchstone for the realists in the 1920's and 1930's.30

28. W. RUMBLE, supra note 24, at 8.
29. J. DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION 126-34 (1931).
30. See W. RUMBLE, supra note 24, at 8; R. KEVELSON, supra note 1.

19861

SEMIOTICS AND THE LA W

II.

INTERPRETATION AS LEGISLATION

Given the scope of this article a historical recapitulation of the development
of theories of legal interpretation is not possible. It might be pointed out,
however, that the concern with interpretation, reaching back as far, in a
systematic way, to the earliest professional law schools in Western civilization-to Bologna and Milan-was primarily with the notion of a legal
system as a closed system, in response to a relatively closed society, within
a fundamentally completed, circumscribed and finite universe. If, as Berman
suggests, the Justinian Codex served the students of law of the 12th and
13th centuries as a frame of reference, the Codex was never assumed to
provide actual reference for then modern legal systems, but was used as a
model only, as a frame of reference for interpreting legal codes in general.3
When Savigny undertook in the 18th century to describe procedures for the
interpretation of law, his fidelity to the Roman codes as such was in an
important sense atavistic.3 2 Subsequent approaches to legal interpretation, in
reacting against Savigny, emphasized the responsibility of interpretation to
a changing society and changing social values. For example, Francis Lieber,
Savigny's student, stressed the concensual nature of interpretation required
in the defining of terms, or signs as he correctly called them. 33 Beal's Cardinal
Rules of Legal Interpretation,in 1896, presumes that such a consensus exists
and, in fact, agreement obtains on the meaning of special, technical legal
terms. Still, definition remained as a paramount task, preliminary to interpretation in the courts. Up until this time the juristic principle, "when the
text is clear there is no room for interpretation," (in claris non fit interpretation) was generally assumed, so that usual or authentic interpretation
referred to the interpretation of law for which rules governing interpretive
processes were provided by the legal system in question and, indeed, were
an integral part of that system. Doctrinal interpretation, on the other hand,
referred to interpretation in the absence of rules for interpretation. This
"doctrinal interpretation," regarded as anomolous in traditional approaches
to interpretation, becomes central from the perspective of legal realism.
One hears Peirce's reminder in the background of legal realism, that all
propositions are, at bottom, hypothetical, and all laws are provisional only.
To Holmes, the capacity to call into question even, and especially, one's
first principles marks the "civilized man." '34 Frank, in Law and the Modern
Mind,35 affirms the need for legal rules; rules, like codes, when absolutely

31. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMULATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION

32.
33.
34.
35.

(1983).
Cf. F. SAVIGNY, supra note 5, at 166-268.
Cf. F. LIEBER, supra note 4.
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS (M. Howe ed. 1953).
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
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binding are a form of legal fundamentalism and as such have no place in
modern society and its institutions. Frank speaks of the construction, or
hypothesizing of doubts with regard to so-called established truths. Doubts
to Frank, as to Peirce, become the means for systematic and scientific
interpretation and thus for greater freedom from dogmatic authority. Frank
says: "Increasing constructive doubt is the sign of advancing civilization.
We must put question marks alongside many of our inherited legal dogmas,
since they are dangerously out of line with social facts." '3 6 Frank, with this
book, was exploring new territory in legal theory and practice. Indeed, he
was no less a pioneer than Peirce, who recognized that his ventures into
semiotics would mark him as a frontiersman in a new, unexplored, and
possibly dangerous field.
What Frank opposed was not so much the "rules of law," but the myth
of certainty in the rules of law. With respect to the rules of interpretation,
Frank was explicit in his refutation of some of the earliest formulations of
interpretation rules which appeared, as mentioned before, at the close of
the nineteenth century. In particular he opposed such doctrines of interpretation as Edward Bele's Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation37 and its
congeners. Frank also opposed the notion of "legal absolutism," advanced
by Harvard law professor Joseph Beale; he, not the earlier Edward, was the
target of Frank's epithet: "Bealism." To the realists, this "Bealism" came
to stand for all of legal absolutism, a movement which they opposed." The
kind of "word-magic" which Frank accused Beale of practicing was, in a
legal context, none other than the denunciatory "nominalism" which Peirce
levelled at his opponents. Frank clearly follows the path of the law which
Holmes, implicitly affirming Peircean method, had cut through. Frank says
that "Rules, whether stated by judges or others, whether in statutes, opinions
or text-books by learned authors, are not the Law, but are only some among
many of the sources to which judges go in making the law of the cases tried
before them." 39 Frank goes on to say that "[t]he law, therefore, consists of
decisions, not of rules. If so, then whenever a judge decides a case he is
making law."' 40 Frank is careful to qualify what he means by "decisions";
they are signs which point to future decisions, or, in Peirce's terms, they
are indexical signs. 41 Frank speaks of the "if-y" and the "chancy"; 42 and

36. Id. at 159.

37. E.

BELE, CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

(1896).

38. J. PAUL, THE LEGAL REALISM OF JEROME N. FRANK 35-38 (1959).
39. J. FRANK, supra note 35, at 127.
40. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
41. Id. See also Kevelson, Legal Speech Acts: Decisions, in LINGUISTICS AND THE PROFESSIONS
121 (R. DiPietro ed. 1982), where a decision is regarded as having the structure of the
interrogative in verbal legal acts.
42. See Frank, A Conflict with Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal
Pragmatism, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 428-29 (1954).
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although there is little or no direct reference to Peirce's semiotics in Frank's
voluminous writings, it is fair to assume that what he means by these terms
is what Peirce, himself, describes as hypothetical reasoning (the "if-y") and
the element of chance (the "chancy"). This element of chance must be taken
into account in a universe which Becomes, rather than Is, in an infinite
universe which we, as makers of reality and its laws through our sign
constructions, create. It is no mere coincidence that prompts Frank to write
on the application of non-Euclidean geometry to law; it is Peirce's influence
which finds one of its most ripe and receptive carriers in Frank. In a
footnote, 43 Julius Paul remarks that Frank was critical of his fellow realists
(like Llewellyn, Patterson, Cardozo and Felix Cohen) and critical as well of
John Dewey whose pragmatism shared, with the above realists, a lack of
dimensionality which Frank felt was essential. Frank, according to Paul, did
not "discover" Charles Peirce until 1942 (if we are to believe Wormuth).4
A more faithful report on this "discovery" would reveal that Frank, like
Peirce before him, had begun to think beyond three-dimensionality, to multidimensionality which presupposes, in von Wright's words, a logic "which
studies the conceptual frame of a dynamic world, a world of change and
flux," a world in which contradiction plays a major role and not one in
45
which paradox is to be resolved and eliminated.
For many of the legal realists the problem of interpretation was tantamount
to a rejection of legal positivism, perhaps exemplified by Kelsen who contrasts
positive law with sociological jurisprudence.4 6 In some ways Kelsen is compatible with Peirce although he is clearly opposed to the position of soci47
ological jurisprudence, which he identifies with the "American legal realists.
Kelsen contrasts his position by stating that a normative theory of the law
attempts to prescribe how rules govern men in their practical affairs through
the mediation of legal and other deontic systems. The object of sociological
jurisprudence, or American realism, he points out, intends only to describe
how persons actually do behave and how a legal system of rules merely
extends actual behavior in an authorized and responsive manner. Actual
behavior is the starting point for observing general principles which can then
be written into legal rules. Society, then, is the model for a legal system,
and not, according to .the positivists, the other way around, with the law
48
as model for right conduct.
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Peirce's position is that semiotics, or logic as a whole, is descriptive rather
than prescriptive. His methodology, similarly, is descriptive. It attempts to
account for the process of evolving thought and does not attempt to impose
commands of an ethical or moral nature on the phenomenon of thinking.
In this respect, as in others, Dewey is at variance with Peirce. Dewey does
wish to use a logic of inquiry as an instrument for bringing about correct
thinking, especially with respect to indeterminate situations and apparent
paradox. This is an essential distinction. If this distinction is not marked as
perhaps the most significant difference between the positivists and the realists,
Kelsen's notion that a "rule of law" is, "like the law of nature, a hypothetical
judgment that attaches a specific consequence to a specific condition" seems
Peircean and not unlike the realism of Pound, for example, or even Llewellyn. 49 On the one hand, according to Kelsen, rules for interpretation are
hypotheses, but these hypothetical or provisional rules exert a deontic force:
they are to be regarded at least on the surface as binding and as if they
were commands which "ought" to be followed, that is, referred to precedentially. Thus, the need for legalisms and legal fictions which honor the
imputed permanence of the provisional rule perpetuates the myth, as Frank
claimed. It should be mentioned that Kelsen denies the coercive force of a
rule in law. Kelsen denies that law exerts an enforced obedience and he
insists that the moral and psychic sanction which members of society experience in the violation of fundamental rules of conduct is merely transferred
to the legal system, which carries out society's moral condemnation in a
specifiable and concrete manner. Kelsen argues that "the law is not, as
Austin formulates it, rule 'enforced' by a specified authority, but rather a
norm which provides a specific measure of coercion as sanction." 50 In effect,
Kelsen's theory-the pure theory of law-conflates values with ethics and
shows the normative character of the law as a mechanism for fulfilling ideal
social goals and for repairing the ideal fabric of society which is rent by its
delicts. From this view a whole is presupposed; from Peirce's views, and
from the view of the Realists, the idea of wholeness in society in general,
or in law as a particular social institution, is at best a working idea-a
model subject to change and correction, or, in a word, an experiment.
If a positive jurisprudence intends to reinforce belief in a stable and
nonchanging code, a system of law which is predominantly under the influence of the positivists may actually regard rules for interpretation (and
interpretation in each case) as provisional. However, this system of law will
superimpose over the provisionality of rules a semblance of absoluteness,
such that the interpretive acts of the judiciary appear to be discovery rather
than the invention in law which, in fact, they are.

49. Id. at 51.
50. Id. at 57-58.
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On the other hand, the realists' position, at its most extreme (in the
writings of Lon Fuller), states that "all forms of legal positivism have the
common characteristic of being formal in their method; they deal not with
the content of the law but with its form and sanction." 5 ' Fuller argues for
greater judicial autonomy over against the traditional sovereignty of the
legislator. Interpretation, in Fuller's proposed system, would become the
responsibility of the judge to deliberately evolve a rule so that the rule
becomes subsumed in the interpretation; that is, the rule's meaning becomes
part of the accumulated meaning of the new decision which does not merely
extend the old rule but, in effect, transforms it into a new sign, or new law.
This new law, in Peirce's sense, is what he calls an interpretant. In any
given process of inquiry, the object, or rule in question, is the immediate
interpretant. Its "factiveness," or agreed-upon definition with respect to the
case at hand in the inquiring experience is the dynamic interpretant. The
adaptation to the case at hand by means of qualification, revision, redefinition, or any of the available means by which meaning is increased in a
term results in a judgment arrived at through interpretation. This judgment
is the final interpretant. This final interpretant conveys a kind of certainty
in the law until, or unless, in the future some "surprising fact" or novel
aspect of another case impels fresh doubt and hence fresh inquiry into the
relation between the law, now as a provisional given, and the situation at
hand. Thus, every case brings with it at least the possibility of doubt, and
therefore the possibility of a new inquiry resulting in a new judgment, law,
or final interpretant emerges.
Fuller mentions in a footnote 2 to his argument in favor of judge-made
law the school of legal realism in Sweden, which derives from the writings
of Hagerstrom, and is best known to English readers through Law as Fact,
by Olivecrona.53 There is little evidence to support the thesis that Hagerstrom
and his disciples, including Olivecrona, were familiar with Peirce's work;
but indirectly, through Dewey, we would expect to find a Peircean semiotics
in full play.
Fuller's claim, which is supported by the Swedish realists, 54 is that the
judge plays an active role, through interpretation, in shaping common morality; he does so in a dialogue with society, in response to the changing
values of a changing community. Realists such as Fuller are intent upon
reasserting the malleable and revisable character of a common law, and want
to show that the rule of today's judiciary, in shaping extra-legal or moral
attitudes, is in large measure comparable to the pre-statutory period of the
common law when the dialogue between the highest judge in English common

51. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 133-34 (1940) (emphasis added).
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law-the King-was clearly of a dialogic and responsive nature. This dialogic
structure, as has been shown elsewhere," is describable by a logic of questions
and answers-an erotetic logic to which a deontic logic is subordinate and
5 6
derived.
Fuller, it should be noted, does not go as far as others known as realists.
For example, Roland Gray as early as 1909 set about to refute Austin's
theory of the sovereign and to show that the actual force in the making of
law and the keeping of legal unity was the judge.17 Gray failed to regard a
judicial act, such as an interpretive decision, as an act; instead, he regarded
such acts as commentary only. Holmes, on the other hand, had shown more
than a dozen years earlier that a judicial decision was effectively more than
mere commentary, or words, but was in fact consequential action."' It is
appropriate to remark in this context that Peirce and the pragmatists who
followed him believed also that all thought was action, but of a form which
differed from observable physical acts. Peirce regarded ideas as phenomena,
and maintained that one could, indeed, observe the development of an idea
by mapping it, or representing it diagrammatically. Thus, in terms of movement toward the realization of a goal, Peirce's predictive semiotic method
assumed that visible physical motion and process was no more and no less
action than the growth of a thought. This thought is considered phenomenal
because its consequences, or extensions, may be readily ascertained as a fact
by any community of thinking persons.
The concluding few pages of this article discuss the notion of fact from
the shared perspective of the realists and the pragmatists, especially Peirce.
What facts are admissible in discovery? What is needed for something to
function as a fact in discovery? How does a logic of discovery for law
account for the selection of facts? The foregoing disucssion is intended more
to open questions than to resolve them. In particular, this discussion is
intended to indicate how Peirce's semiotics, rejecting both positivism and
nominalism, places the process of inquiry within an open-ended frame of
creating relations out of novel material as well as creating new structures
of relationship between the given and the new. This logic of inquiry, or
semiotics, transforms previous notions of interpretation. Peirce's interpretation of signs as integral within inquiring processes is a method which bears
little resemblance to the theories of hermeneutics currently in the forefront
of Continental philosophic interest. As stressed throughout, Peirce's se-
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miotics is most faithfully represented by the legal realists, as far as they
went, but not as far as this idea may yet evolve.

III.

DISCOVERY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article has made mention of inquiry as a method of discovery, which
is describable by a logic of questions and answers. In law, interrogatory
procedures have traditionally been a part of legal discovery, and have developed as one among other methods of discovery. When William Petheran
wrote his treatise, The Law and Practice Relating to Discovery by Interrogatories Under the Common Law ProcedureAct, 1854,19 it was evident that
not all interrogatories may be conducted as means through which discovery
may be sought, but rather only those interrogatories for which rules of
procedure and interpretation have been established. At this time reference
is made to the fact that it is the courts which establish those rules which
determine what kind of interrogatory may be administered, and how it is
to be administered. The problem of the interrogatory includes the selection
of appropriate affidavits and testimony which are preliminary to the administering of interrogatories. Not all interrogatories imply oral questioning
of litigants in court. An important feature of this early examination of
discovery is that the shaping of discovery was largely in the context of equity
proceedings.
In 1912 Robert Ross published what appears to be the first comprehensive
discovery treatise: The Law of Discovery.60 This treatise set forth the general
rules relating to discovery in law and the related rules, both general and
particular, which governed interrogatories. Here, too, it is the court, or
judge, who decides: (1) if interrogatories will be permitted; (2) if permitted,
which will be permitted; and (3) which interrogatories, if any, are even to
be considered. The criteria for the allowing of documents related to proposed
interrogatories have to do both with the question of fairness with respect
to the case, and also with the economic costs involved. Thus, the problem
of cost and discovery was as crucial seventy years ago as it is in the present,
especially in deriving legal and economic relations. If interrogatories are
allowed they must be confined only to those questions which enable the
interrogating party to obtain information directly related to the material
facts which are at issue. To begin with, then, in discovery all of the procedure
permitted or disallowed is entirely at the discretion of the judge.
Disclosure of evidentiary documents and inspection of such documents
are clearly distinguished. In a similar fashion, Peirce would hold that the
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selection of a "quality" is equivalent to the disclosing of a potential fact.
But the examination of the so-called fact is a different stage of the discovery
process, both in legal procedure and in Peirce's phenomenological preliminary to semiotic analysis. A fact, to Peirce, is not yet a sign. Analogously,
the admissibility of evidence or facts in court is a prior stage to the interpretation of the fact with respect to the settling of a claim.
Peirce's phenomenology, as a preliminary stage to the semiotic inquiry,
corresponds methodologically to discovery in law. What is needed is a point
by point discussion of the correspondence between Peirce's discovery procedures and his justification of such procedures within a logic of discovery,
and discovery in law as preliminary to the court's judgment on the case.
This is a task for the immediate future of legal semiotics.
It should be pointed out that Peirce had not worked out a logic of
discovery, but had discussed it in much detail. Gore, at the end of the
nineteenth century, was among the first to point to the need for a logic of
discovery as a means of accounting for the transition from felt values to
ethical conduct in scientific inquiry, to a testing of such values in a logical
manner according to the method of a logic of discovery. 61 Carmichael, in
1930, in The Logic of Discovery, equates a logic of discovery with a logic
of creativity. If this is the case then Carmichael must believe it highly unlikely
that a science of inference from the known to the unknown can be developed.
But this is not the major problem Carmichael sees. He says that the major
stumbling block is that "[d]iscovery is relative to the point of view," ' 62 and,
therefore, would need not a logic of discovery, but rather, logics of discovery.
This is precisely Peirce's point when he stresses that the aim of semiotics is
to make clear and accessible a method of methods, that is, a method of
inquiry which permits inquiry into not one but a countless number of points
of view or of systems of thought. Further, Peirce held that we need such a
method of methods to see how these various thought systems are related,
or become related, or give birth to new relations. The method of semiotics,
then, would provide a means of deriving the most general principles upon
which the judiciary decides, even for the most realist of active judges. Rather
than focus on the arbitrariness of individual judicial decisions, Semiotics
would seek the principles of inquiry which relate even opposing judges, as
each represents a system of thought. Peirce's Methodology-an inquiry into
inquiry-seeks to bridge systems of thought by creating new relations between
them.
Finally, it has long been accel5ted, if even as a controversial issue, that
what we call a "material fact" is not a single, observable phenomenon.
Rather a fact is a complex organization of prior judgments. Peirce, similarly,
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anticipating the inquiry of science-in law as in physics-into the unity of
the fact itself (the empirical and presumably verifiable "thing"), carefully
explains how even the first glimpse of an observable is never actually a first
glimpse, but is an inference from previous judgments of former glimpses
which only appear single, but which at every stage are relationsof judgments
of the observable fact in question. Thus at every stage, beginning with the
admission of a quality of an observable in one's attention, facts are always
relationships. No factual relationship can ever truly be established on infallible ground. No matter how fine our instruments, Peirce insists, no
individual can discover a fact. A fact requires the testimony of two or more
persons who agree to agree on the fact as such.
So long as we no longer regard individuals as atomistic particles of society,
or regard law as a discrete institution in a social context-or self-referential
only-we are forced to begin inquiry with a contradiction between two points
of view, where two points of view are, because they are two points of view,
contradictory in some respect.
To paraphrase von Wright, if we ignore the underlying contradictory
relation we lapse into an untenable conviction which holds onto a nonexistent
unity, or finite totality of rule. But, if we "lose at the micro-level what we
gained at the macro-level" we lose a measure of possible freedom. 63 Unfortunately, von Wright gives Peirce little credit for having earlier arrived
at a similar conclusion; von Wright proposes a deontic method of inquiry
in law where as mentioned, the more primitive (that is, more basic) would
be interrogative logic of inquiry.
Holmes' view of law as an experiment presupposed such freedom of inquiry
and interpretation. The realists who followed did not go far enough, either
forward or back to the Peircean semiotic basis of inquiry. It remains for
those who elect to evolve this idea to regard it as an interpretant, infinitely
open to inquiry and to the genuine novelty of contemporary thought upon
this special topic.
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